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Who Gets the Drought: The
Standard of Causation Necessary
in Cases of Equitable
Apportionment
E. Tate Crymes*
I. INTRODUCTION
More than just an amenity, “[a river] is a treasure” noted Justice
Holmes in a dispute over the waters of the Delaware River.1 Water is a
unique resource in that it is fluid and can move between borders of
sovereign states. When water flows across state boundaries, there are
often conflicts between the rights of the powerful upstream state and the
vulnerable downstream state. Although water rights laws vary across the
United States, most eastern states adopt the principle that the right to
water is equal for both states.2
Along with the unique nature of water and the disputes that arise from
its flow, droughts and their devastating consequences prove to dry up
more than just water sources. Without Supreme Court precedent
requiring a “but-for” standard of causation in matters of equitable
apportionment, viable controversies between sovereign states will be
settled in favor of the upstream state by the Court due to the existence
of a drought. If the Supreme Court still believes the words of Justice
Holmes that “[a river] is a treasure,” a causation standard akin to a “butfor” standard will be required.
The long and tumultuous history of equitable apportionment law and
the drought of cases arising in the east compared to the west has led to
*

First, I would like to thank Professor Stephen Johnson of Mercer University School of Law
for his guidance while serving as my faculty advisor. I would also like to thank Professor
Robin Craig of the University of Southern California’s Gould School of Law for her thoughts
and advice as well. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their support.
1. New Jersey v. New York (New Jersey I), 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931).
2. Colorado v. New Mexico (Colorado I), 459 U.S. 176, 179 n.4 (1982).
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the seminal importance of each and every interstate water dispute. The
Supreme Court’s hesitancy to reach the question of what level of
causation is required in cases of equitable apportionment in the most
recent iteration of Florida v. Georgia (Florida II),3 leaves a looming
unanswered question in well-established equitable apportionment law.
Evidence from principles of equitable apportionment law generally, the
rest of the opinion,4 other water (and other resource) disputes, and
general tort law concepts may be used to predict and shape the future
answer to this question.
Though there are few cases regarding equitable apportionment, the
Court has adopted broad sweeping rules to address many of the issues
that arise in these cases.5 The state requesting apportionment6 must
prove an actual or threatened injury of serious magnitude caused by
upstream water consumption and that state must prove that the benefits
of apportionment substantially outweigh the harm that might result
from the Court stepping in.7
In the Court’s most recent equitable apportionment decision, Florida
II, the Court explicitly refused to answer the question of what standard
of causation is required for the first element—an actual or threatened
injury of serious magnitude caused by upstream water consumption—for
the court to equitably apportion state water use.8 Because of the unique
nature of a claim for equitable apportionment, and the reverence the
Supreme Court has for mandating resource allocation among sovereign
states, a high standard of causation is necessary to effectively balance
the harm and the good as required by the Supreme Court’s equitable
apportionment precedent. Though the Court refused to decide that issue
in Florida II, a “substantial cause” test would most effectively advance
the goals articulated by the Court in other recent equitable
apportionment cases.

3. Florida v. Georgia (Florida II), 141 S. Ct. 1175 (2021).
4. See generally Florida II, 141 S. Ct. at 1175 (leaving the question of required
standard of causation unanswered in the opinion but providing some evidence as to what
could be necessary).
5. The Supreme Court has exercised its original jurisdiction powers to hear cases of
equitable apportionment between states ten times. Kansas v. Colorado (Kansas I), 206 U.S.
46, 85 (1907); South Carolina v. North Carolina, 552 U.S. 804 (2007); Arizona v. California,
298 U.S. 558 (1936); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); New Jersey I, 283
U.S. at 336; Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 295 U.S. 40
(1935); Colorado I, 459 U.S. at 176; Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936); Florida II,
141 S. Ct. at 1175.
6. The state bringing the lawsuit is usually the downstream state.
7. Florida II, 141 S. Ct. at 1180.
8. Id. at 1181 n.*.
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Part II of this article will discuss background information regarding
relevant principles of state sovereignty and the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court to hear cases between states. Part III will focus on
applicable equitable apportionment doctrine analysis with illustrations
of seminal cases. The clear and convincing evidence standard will be
analyzed in Part IV and the standard of causation of the alleged harm
will follow in Part V. The Court’s hesitancy to make an explicit holding
on the requisite standard of causation will be noted in Part VI. An overall
conclusion will reiterate the important points at the very end in Part VII.
II. STATE SOVEREIGNTY VERSUS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
A right to streamflow is a justiciable issue recognized at common law.9
At one end of the spectrum of outcomes of state options for river use, it is
within the physical power of the upstream state to completely cut off the
water supply of the downstream state.10 This extreme use of the shared
resource cannot be tolerated and the sovereign rights of both the
upstream and the downstream state must be reconciled.11 A river is a
finite resource that must be “rationed among those who have power over
it.”12 Because of the vulnerable nature of a downstream state, the Court
is tasked with predicating a state’s sovereign right to use water within
its borders on reasonable use.13
For more than a century, the Supreme Court has recognized its
inherent authority to equitably apportion interstate waters between
states.14 To obtain equitable apportionment, a State must prove (1) an
actual or threatened injury of serious magnitude caused by upstream
water consumption and (2) that the benefits of apportionment
substantially outweigh the harm that might result from the mandate.15
The complaining State must prove injury and causation by clear and
convincing evidence.16 This burden of proof is very high and is equivalent
to the statement that the evidence is substantially more likely to be true

9. Kansas I, 206 U.S. at 85.
10. New Jersey I, 283 U.S. at 342.
11. Id. at 342–43.
12. Id. at 342.
13. Kansas I, 206 U.S. at 100.
14. Id. at 98 (holding for the first time that equitable apportionment would be the
doctrine employed between states even if the two states employed different water rights
schemes at common law).
15. Florida II, 141 S. Ct. at 1180.
16. Id. at 1182.
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than untrue.17 For a Court to reach into a sovereign state’s territory and
mandate how the state may use its water, the Court must be absolutely
convinced of the evidence of the harm and its cause.
A vital and sometimes scarce resource, water has been the subject of
over 100 years of litigation in the Supreme Court.18 Much of this
litigation has taken place between states in the western portion of the
United States.19 This is relevant because of the differences in doctrines
applicable to states in the east and the west. Differences in water scarcity
and geographical makeup have driven the eastern states and the western
states to follow different sets of doctrines regarding water rights.20
Although individual states may adopt water rights laws that apply
within the state, those laws will not apply to activities in other states.
Thus, when there are disputes between states regarding waters that flow
between the states, as opposed to disputes between individuals in the
same state, the Supreme Court is called upon to intervene, exercising its
original jurisdiction to resolve disputes arising between sovereign
states.21 This authority was recognized and implemented by Article III of
the United States Constitution22 and 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a).23 Cases
between states are unique in that the Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction to hear these cases.24 This original jurisdiction brings with it
different requirements and procedural obligations than those that apply
to cases and disputes among non-state entities before the Court.25 At that
point, the water rights laws of the states are considered as part of a
broader analysis by the Court under its own jurisprudence regarding the
doctrine of equitable apportionment.26 The underlying water rights
doctrine of the state still serves as a vital, yet secondary, part of the
Court’s analysis.27
When two states are involved in interstate litigation over water rights,
the extent of state sovereignty becomes relevant. Litigation must serve
two goals to be an effective solution when states are parties to a suit

17. Colorado v. New Mexico (Colorado II), 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984).
18. Kansas I, 206 U.S. at 87; Colorado I, 459 U.S. at 183.
19. Kansas I, 206 U.S. at 101; Colorado I, 459 U.S. at 184.
20. Colorado I, 459 U.S. at 180 n.4.
21. Id. at 177.
22. U.S. Const. amend. III, § 2.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (“The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more States.”).
24. U.S. Const. amend. III, § 2.
25. Colorado II, 467 U.S. at 315–16.
26. Id. at 315–17.
27. Colorado I, 459 U.S. at 183–84.
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involving a matter of sovereign interest.28 These twin goals are (1)
ensuring that due respect is given to sovereign dignity and (2) providing
a working rule for good judicial administration.29 Neither State may
impose its own legislation or policy upon the other state.30 “Equality of
right” underscores the interactions of states between each other, yet each
is called to make decisions and use resources that are naturally shared
between the two equal sovereigns, so some higher power must be
employed.31 Because of the unique nature of not only this shared resource
but the rights held by each state to use that resource, disputes—though
they may not be very common—are large in scale and require the Court
to expend much time and resources.
A lawsuit between two sovereign states in the Supreme Court begins
with the Court as fact finder.32 For efficiency, the Court will appoint a
Special Master to facilitate the often-tedious, time consuming, and
expensive process of fact-finding.33 The Court has the discretion to
appoint the Special Master, but in cases of original jurisdiction, for the
sake of efficiency the Court will often appoint this person to investigate
specific claims or to advise the Court on a technical issue.34 The Special
Master reviews the evidence from both parties and makes an official
report and recommendation to the Court based on the evidence presented
to the Special Master. 35
Upon reviewing the recommendation of the Special Master, the parties
may object to the report and recommendation of the Special Master by
filing exceptions with the Court to the recommendation of the Special

28. South Carolina v. North Carolina, 558 U.S. 256, 266 (2010); New Jersey v. New
York (New Jersey II), 345 U.S. 369, 373 (1953).
29. South Carolina, 558 U.S. at 266; New Jersey II, 345 U.S. at 373.
30. Kansas I, 206 U.S. at 95.
31. Id. at 97.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
33. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53.
34. Special Master, Cornell Legal Information Institute (2021).
35. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53. Special Masters are appointed by the Court in this capacity
usually for their specific expertise in a complex area. The Supreme Court uses them in cases
of original jurisdiction for two purposes: (1) to more efficiently find fact than the Court
would and (2) to bring their personal expertise to a usually complex topic. For example, in
Florida I, Special Master Lancaster had served as a Special Master three times previously.
Florida v. Georgia (Florida I), 138 S. Ct. 2502 (2018); In Memorium Ralph I. Lancaster, Jr.,
Pierce Atwood LLP, (October 1, 2021) https://www.pierceatwood.com/memoriam-ralph-ilancaster-jr. In Florida II, Special Master Paul Kelly is a Senior United States Circuit Court
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 141 S. Ct. at 1175; Kelly,
Paul
Joseph,
Jr.,
Federal
Judicial
Center,
(October
1,
2021)
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/kelly-paul-joseph-jr.
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Master.36 Because the Special Master does not officially displace or
supersede the Court or its authority to settle cases and controversies
between sovereign states, upon objection—or the filing of exceptions—by
an involved party, the Court may review the Special Master’s findings
before issuing its ruling on the facts of the case.37
III. APPLICABLE DOCTRINES
At common law, each state has its own scheme for analyzing water
rights. Split roughly between the 100th meridian of the contiguous
United States, the states east of this demarcation generally employ a
form of riparian rights at common law.38 Riparian rights or riparian
ownership is an “[o]wnership interest in a river or stream derived from
ownership of one of the banks.”39 West of the line of demarcation, the
mostly arid states usually invoke the doctrine of prior appropriation.40
Ownership rights under this doctrine are derived from the concept that
“[w]hoever appropriates water for a reasonable use has priority over later
appropriators.”41 There are variations by each state, but in general, this
system of division between eastern and western states is relatively
consistent throughout the United States.42 State courts may determine
their own common law in respect to the doctrines of prior appropriation
or riparian rights and the Court or Congress may not dictate which of
these doctrines a state employs.43
Though English common law, originally brought to this country prior
to the founding of America, followed the doctrine of riparian rights
generally adopted by eastern states, most of the early disputes filed in
the Supreme Court among sovereign states over equitable apportionment
of shared river resources arose in the western portion of the United
States.44 Although the majority of disputes between states over water

36. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(2).
37. Id.; Colorado II, 467 U.S. at 317; see Mississippi v. Arkansas, 415 U.S. 289, 291-92,
294 (1974).
38. Nisha D. Noroian, Prior Appropriation, Agriculture and the West: Caught in a Bad
Romance, 51 Jurimetrics J. 181–215, 181 (2011).
39. Riparian Ownership (Riparian Rights), Bouvier Law Dictionary (2012).
40. Colorado I, 459 U.S. at 180, n.4.
41. Prior Appropriation Doctrine, Bouvier Law Dictionary (2012).
42. Colorado I, 459 U.S. at 180, n.4.
43. Kansas I, 206 U.S. at 94.
44. Id. at 94–95.
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apportionment have been between states in the west, currently, there is
a rise of eastern state disputes.45
A. Equitable Apportionment
Disputes between sovereign states concerning rights to the use of
water from an interstate stream are governed by the doctrine of equitable
apportionment.46 This doctrine—favoring a fair distribution of water
rights as opposed to common law doctrines proscribing water rights like
riparianism or the doctrine of prior appropriation—is employed by the
Supreme Court when making these decisions. Multiple factors are
considered by the Court when tasked with “secur[ing] a ‘just and
equitable’ allocation” of water between states.47 A factor of great
importance for consideration is the doctrine governing the involved
states’ water management.48 This factor is not conclusive, though,
because individual state law is not controlling in this instance between
two states; pertinent state law is merely a factor for consideration
amongst other factors.49
Neither state may enforce its doctrines or policy upon the other;
therefore, when discrepancies arise, the Supreme Court must step in.50
In situations where the actions of one state infringe the sovereignty of
another, the Court is called on to equally balance rights of each State
while establishing an outcome that brings justice for both.51 However,
equitable apportionment is directed at alleviating the complaining
State’s present harm and preventing its alleged future harm. Equitable
apportionment is not used to compensate a State for a prior injury.52
The Supreme Court is tasked with employing the doctrine of equitable
apportionment to settle these types of disputes in an equitable and
effective way.53 In settling the first case of equitable apportionment in
45. Id. at 95; Colorado I, 459 U.S. at 183–84; see Florida II, 141 S. Ct. at 1175 (deciding
a dispute between two eastern states in the most recent exercise of Supreme Court
equitable apportionment power). Although the Supreme Court does not use the states’
chosen common law doctrine to bind both parties in the dispute, each state’s framework is
an important factor for analysis, as discussed below. Colorado I, 459 U.S. at 183-84.
46. Colorado I, 459 U.S. at 183; Kansas I, 206 U.S. at 117–18; Connecticut, 282 U.S. at
670–71.
47. Colorado I, 459 U.S. at 183 (quoting Nebraska v. Wyoming (Nebraska II), 325 U.S.
589, 618 (1945)).
48. Colorado I, 459 U.S. at 183–84.
49. Id.
50. Kansas I, 206 U.S. at 95–96.
51. Id. at 97–98.
52. Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1025–26 (1983).
53. Kansas I, 206 U.S. at 95–96.
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the Supreme Court, in 1906, Justice Brewer noted that if the two states
in conflict were independent nations, the disputes would be settled either
by treaty or by war.54 The Supreme Court cannot force a contract, or
treaty, upon the sovereign states and war is not a endorsed option.55 This
leaves the Supreme Court with the daunting and sometimes very
technically specific task of water allocation between sovereign entities.
B. Western States
At common law, states in the west use the doctrine of prior
appropriation to efficiently and effectively divide property rights of the
water that flows through the rivers.56 Under the prior appropriation
doctrine, the rights of water users are ranked by seniority—first in time
to use the right—and do not depend on land ownership, but are ranked
and measured by actual use of the water.57 Most of the states located west
of the 100th meridian follow this doctrine and rights to water are
acquired by diverting water and using it for a beneficial purpose.58
Traditionally, western states are faced with a more arid climate than
states in the east. The foundations of the prior appropriation doctrine are
built upon the anxieties surrounding the allocation of this scarce
resource.59
1. Kansas v. Colorado
In the case of Kansas v. Colorado, Kansas brought a claim under the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to decide a dispute between it
and Colorado regarding rights to, and uses of, the water of the Arkansas
River flowing between the borders of both states.60 This was the first time
the Court was required to make a ruling regarding equitable
apportionment of river water between two sovereign states.61
At the state level, Kansas and Colorado each employed different
doctrines for water rights.62 Kansas adopted the riparian rights doctrine
while Colorado employed the doctrine of prior appropriation.63 The
54. Id. at 98.
55. See Id. (holding that there are imposed and natural limits to what the Supreme
Court can do to ensure equitable water use between states).
56. Colorado I, 459 U.S. at 180 n.4.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 184.
60. See generally Kansas I, 206 U.S. at 46.
61. Id. at 80.
62. Id. at 95.
63. Id. at 85.
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Supreme Court, however, recognized that because this controversy
affected more than just local private rights to water and ultimately
implicated overall state interests, the scope of the Court’s inquiry
encompassed more than just the question of “whether any portion of the
waters of the Arkansas [River was] withheld by Colorado.”64
The question before the Court in Kansas I, was more than just a simple
dichotomous, factual question.65 Instead, the question before the Court
was how the Court should consider the effect of the withholding of water
upon both states and adjust the outcome based on equity between
Colorado’s need for water to irrigate its land without depriving Kansas
of its own use of the stream.66 In answering this question, the Court set
boundaries for what is, and is not, allowed for future analysis of equitable
apportionment disputes.67
In dicta, the Court stated that if, under the facts, Colorado
appropriated the entire flow of the Arkansas River, effectively cutting off
access entirely to the river for Kansas, the Court could not uphold an
appropriation that extreme, even if Colorado agreed to give Kansas
something in return for the water.68 The Court reasoned that ratifying
this action would be akin to creating a contract between the two states,
something the Court cannot do.69 Though this hypothetical proposed by
the Court is not binding precedent, it does give a glimpse into how the
Court would treat a situation of this nature and what the Court views as
within and outside of the scope of Supreme Court power at the heart of
equitable apportionment.
Instead, looking beyond a numerical approach to deciding the amount
of water each state can use, the Court in Kansas I set guidelines for
considering what effects and uses of the water are reasonable.70
Considering the effects of water appropriation by one state on another
possessing identical and equal rights to that same source of water is an
analysis the Supreme Court must frequently undertake in equitable
apportionment cases.71 When conducting that analysis, the Court often

64. Id. at 99–100.
65. Id. at 100.
66. Id. The early stages of the elements of a case of equitable apportionment were
articulated here.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. (holding that the use of the water comports with the underlying “prior
appropriation doctrine” used in the west).
71. Id. at 102.
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examines the benefits and harms that flow from apportionment or the
failure to apportion water rights.72
In Kansas I, the Supreme Court noted that although Kansas was
experiencing injury because of Colorado’s withdrawal of water from the
Arkansas River, the benefit to Colorado was very high and the detriment
to Kansas was very low.73 Colorado had, in fact, diminished the flow to
Kansas, but the overall benefit of the appropriation to the Arkansas
Valley of Kansas exceeded the harm caused by Colorado’s withdrawal of
water.74 Under the withdrawal rates of the Arkansas River by Colorado,
the Court found the division and usage of water between the two states
to be equitable and that any adjustment by the Supreme Court would
disrupt the equitable apportionment of the river water between the two
states.75
Because Kansas had failed to allege a substantial injury for the Court
to remedy, the Court dismissed Kansas’ action.76 The action was
dismissed without prejudice with a warning from the Court that if the
facts changed and if the withdrawal of water from the Arkansas River by
Colorado were to increase so much so that there was “no longer an
equitable division of benefits,” the Court could revisit apportionment of
the waters of the Arkansas River in the future.77
In 1943, the Supreme Court was called upon again to revisit the
question of equitable apportionment of the waters of the Arkansas River
between Colorado and Kansas.78 New factors, including an extreme
increase in water withdrawal by Colorado, caused Kansas to bring suit
again in the Supreme Court.79
Again, the Court refused to step in and equitably apportion the water
withdrawal rate of Colorado.80 The Court reasoned that because of new
water storage technologies employed by Colorado and Kansas, factors
had changed for both states compared to water rates in Kansas I.81 The
Court found the use of the Arkansas River at the time of the lawsuit to
be equitably apportioned and dismissed the case.82 Outside of Court in

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id. at 117.
Id.
Id. at 117–18.
Id.
Id.
Colorado v. Kansas (Kansas II), 320 U.S. 383 (1943).
Id. at 391.
Id. at 400.
Id. at 397.
Id. at 400.
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1949, Colorado and Kansas successfully negotiated a contract outlining
details for an agreed upon appropriation of the Arkansas River by each
ratifying and agreeing to the Arkansas River Compact.83
C. Eastern States
In contrast to the prior appropriation doctrine adopted by western
states, most eastern states employ the doctrine of riparian rights to
resolve water rights disputes between individuals within the states.84
Under the doctrine of riparian rights, a landowner has the right to have
the stream or water source on his land flow by and through his land
unpolluted and undiminished.85 A landowner, under this doctrine, has
the right to use the water by any use that is reasonable with respect to
all others who also have a right to that water.86 Unlike the doctrine of
prior appropriation, in states that follow the doctrine of riparian rights,
the rights to use water originate and are founded in ownership of the
land touching or making the boundary of the water source.87 These rights
are not diminished or forfeited if they are not used by the owner.88
1. New Jersey v. New York
The seminal case for equitable apportionment of an eastern United
States river system is New Jersey v. New York.89 New Jersey brought its
complaint to the Supreme Court in 1931 to enjoin New York from
diverting water from a tributary branch in the Delaware River Basin in
order to provide more drinking water to the people of New York City.90
New Jersey claimed that without an injunction or an equitable
apportionment by the Supreme Court, this diversion of water would
cause harm to the oyster industry in the area.91

83. Arkansas River Compact of 1949, https://apps.csg.org/ncic/Compact.aspx?id=11.
This compact is still in force today, though there have been many iterations of negotiation
between the parties. Kansas-Colorado Arkansas River Compact Fact Sheet, Kansas
Department
of
Agriculture,
(October
2020)
https://agriculture.ks.gov/docs/librariesprovider24/iwi—-kansas-colorado-arkansas-rivercompact/factsheet_20201027.pdf?sfvrsn=615593c1_0.
84. Colorado I, 459 U.S. at 180 n.4.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. New Jersey, 283 U.S. at 336.
90. Id. at 341–42.
91. Id. at 343–44.
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The Court appointed a Special Master to make findings on the facts of
the case and to give a recommendation to the Court for how to proceed.92
The Special Master found that a plan must be implemented between the
states before the diversion of water by New York can take place.93 New
Jersey appealed the findings of the Special Master, and the Supreme
Court granted a hearing on the appeal.94
New York proposed a new plan to provide water for its citizens by
diverting water from tributaries of the Delaware River.95 The tributaries
proposed by New York for water diversion were among the headwaters
of the Delaware River and flow from New York down through
Pennsylvania and eventually mark the border between Pennsylvania,
New York, and New Jersey until flowing into the Atlantic.96 To increase
the water supply for the citizens of New York City, New York proposed a
diversion of water from the Delaware watershed to the residents of New
York City.97 This diversion had not occurred and the harm alleged by
New Jersey had not happened yet, but was imminent.98
New Jersey argued that the Supreme Court should apply the common
law rules of riparian owner rights commonly found to be relied upon in
the eastern states.99 The Court disagreed because the case involved a
dispute between independent sovereigns rather than a dispute between
parties residing in the same state.100 The Court held it would not strictly
apply either state’s common law rules because in an action between two
separate states, one state’s law is not binding upon the other, no matter
how similar the laws or doctrines look.101
The Court recognized that both states had real, substantial, and equal
interests in the river and that those differences must be reconciled by the
Court.102 In order to resolve those differences, the Court stressed that it
would apply the doctrine of equitable apportionment to achieve a fair
allocation of use of the waters, regardless of the formula used to come to
that conclusion.103 However, the Court did hold that the underlying state

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 343.
Id. at 345.
Id. at 343–46.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 341–42.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 343.
Id. at 342.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 342–43.
Id. at 343.
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law should be used as a factor for consideration within an equitable
apportionment analysis, but it should not be the only factor for
consideration or reliance when making a decision.104
New Jersey alleged that the proposed diversion of the water by New
York would harm New Jersey in many ways.105 One of the harms
identified and accepted by the Special Master and the Court was that
New York’s rerouting of water from the Delaware River Basin to New
York City would cause an increase in water salinity that would
irreparably injure the prominent oyster industry of the Delaware Bay.106
The Court found that the effect of increased salinity caused by
diversion of the river would seriously harm the oysters and the river’s
recreation capabilities. 107 If left unchecked, the total amount of damage
would be more than New Jersey should be expected to bear and,
therefore, the Court stepped in and made an equitable apportionment of
the waters of the Delaware River.108
IV. CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF ALLEGED HARM: WHY USE
SUCH A HIGH STANDARD?
Before the Supreme Court will order equitable apportionment of
waters, two of the elements that the complaining state must prove are
the elements of causation and injury.109 The state must prove that it has
suffered a serious injury caused by the withdrawal of water by an
upstream state.110 The complaining state must demonstrate the injury
and causation by clear and convincing evidence.111
Although the clear and convincing evidence standard has been
articulated by the Court for over 100 years,112 during the controversy over
the use of the water of the Vermejo River that flows between Colorado
and New Mexico, the Supreme Court carefully described the burden of
proving an injury in equitable apportionment cases and explained the
reasoning behind such an unnaturally high standard compared to other

104. Id.
105. Id. at 343–44.
106. Id. at 345.
107. Id. at 346.
108. Id. at 345–46 (holding that equitable apportionment was necessary). The exact
formula used by the Court to equitably apportion the water is not necessary for this
analysis.
109. Florida II, 141 S. Ct. at 1180.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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civil cases.113 The Court has further stressed in other cases that the
threat of an invasion of rights must be of such a serious magnitude for
the Court to use the extraordinary power to equitably apportion water
given under the Constitution to bind the actions of one sovereign state
upon the suit of another.114 Therefore, meeting a clear and convincing
standard of evidence is a necessity for the Court to invoke such powers.
A. Colorado v. New Mexico (I and II)
In this controversy regarding the equitable apportionment of the
Vermejo River, Colorado brought a claim in the Supreme Court against
New Mexico.115 During the previous term, the Court appointed a Special
Master to make a recommendation.116 In Colorado I, the Court remanded
for additional factual findings regarding the recommendation of the
Special Master.117 The following term, the case came before the Court
again on exceptions by New Mexico to the additional factual findings of
the Special Master.118
The Court in Colorado II, explained “the standard by which [the Court]
judge[s] proof in actions of equitable apportionment.”119 The Court
employs a standard of proof to show the factfinder the “degree of
confidence” he should have in correctness of a fact.120 Ordinary civil cases
employ a preponderance of the evidence standard, yet the Court held that
the complaining state must prove the harm suffered by a clear and
convincing evidence standard of proof.121 In the case, Colorado would only
be found by the factfinder to have met its substantial burden if it “could
place in the ultimate factfinder an abiding conviction that the truth of its
factual contentions are” probable to a high extent.” 122 The balancing
scales of evidence offered between the interests of the two states must
“instantly tilt[]” upon the complaining state offering their evidence of
harm.123 Because of the unique interests inherent in a water rights

113. Colorado II, 467 U.S. at 315–17.
114. Id. at 316 (citing Colorado I, 459 U.S. at 187–88, and n.13).
115. Colorado II, 467 U.S. at 312.
116. Colorado v. New Mexico, 449 U.S. 1007, n.1 (1980).
117. Colorado II, 467 U.S. at 312.
118. Id. Exemptions is the common term for objecting to the findings of the Special
Master. This term is consistently used across equitable apportionment cases during times
where it might usually be seen as outdated in other cases.
119. Id. at 315.
120. Id. (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J. concurring)).
121. Id. at 316; Colorado I, 459 U.S. at 187–88, n.13.
122. Colorado II, 467 U.S. at 316.
123. Id.
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dispute, the Court held that this higher burden of a standard of clear and
convincing evidence was not only required, but necessary.124
The Court finished its burdens analysis by laying out the test for
whether equitable apportionment is necessary.125 The Court will step in
and equitably apportion the water only if the complaining state shows by
clear and convincing evidence that “actual inefficiencies in present uses
or future benefits from other uses are highly probable.”126
Turning to apply this test to the facts at hand, the Court found that
Colorado failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that the injury to New Mexico from the apportionment of water
would be outweighed by the benefits to Colorado as well as that
reasonable water saving measures could compensate for the injury.127
A state can meet its burden during a case of equitable apportionment
only if it presents specific evidence regarding how uses of the water might
be improved or how a project is less efficient than previously thought.128
This evidence must be specifically presented and “mere assertions”
concerning efficiencies of the projects will not carry the burden.129 To
minimize the chances of the Supreme Court issuing an erroneous
decision in a case with implications as enormous as in controversies
requiring or merely pleading for equitable apportionment, “hard facts,
not suppositions or opinions” are required to prove the alleged harm by
clear and convincing evidence.130 The Court held in Colorado II, that
Colorado failed to provide enough evidence to meet high burden and
therefore, the action was dismissed.131
V. STANDARD OF CAUSATION OF THE ALLEGED HARM
Though causation and harm must also be proved by clear and
convincing evidence in cases of equitable apportionment, the requisite
standard of causation is still unresolved.132 In the most recent case of
Supreme Court original jurisdiction regarding equitable apportionment,
Florida brought an action in the Supreme Court over access to interstate
waters and damage to Florida’s prominent oyster industry.133 It appeared
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id. at 317.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 320.
Id.
Id. at 320–21.
Id. at 321.
Florida II, 141 S. Ct. at 1181 n.*.
Id. at 1178–79.
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to some speculators that the Supreme Court might clarify the causation
standard that applies in equitable apportionment cases.134 During oral
argument in 2021 before the Supreme Court of the United States for the
case of Florida v. Georgia, Chief Justice Roberts boldly started the
questioning of counsel for Florida, Gregory Garre, by asking Mr. Garre:
[H]ow should we analyze the case if we think based on the record that
Georgia contributed to the collapse of the oyster harvest but not
enough to cause that on its own, that the situation is like that on
‘Murder on the Orient Express,’ a lot of things took a stab at the
fishery: drought, overharvesting, Florida regulatory policies, but also
lower salinity that was caused by Georgia’s use of the water. But you
can’t say that any one of those things [are] responsible for [killing] the
fishery.135

The Chief Justice began the questioning by going straight to the heart
of the problem of multiple-factor causation. For the Supreme Court to
infringe upon a state’s sovereign rights, a high burden must be met by
the complaining (and usually downstream) state regarding proof of
causation and damage.136 A complaining state may have alleged a harm;
however, the Court does not have the authority to exercise an extreme
reach of power, infringing upon the sovereignty of a state, without being
persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that the upstream state was
the cause of injury to the downstream state.137 However, nowhere under
Supreme Court equitable apportionment caselaw is there a stipulated
amount of causation necessary for the Court to invoke their authority
over the sovereign states.138
The Court ultimately did not reach a conclusion to the question posed
by the Chief Justice of what to do with multiple causes of harm. 139 The
Court instead held that regardless of the standard of causation, Florida
did not present enough evidence under any of the standards for the
standard of causation to be a justiciable question under the facts in
Florida II. 140 However, the reluctance of the Supreme Court to answer
134. Laura Fowler, In interstate water dispute, two stories, conflicting evidence and an
uncertain outcome, SCOTUSBLOG, (Feb. 23, 2021) https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/02/ininterstate-water-dispute-two-stories-conflicting-evidence-and-an-uncertain-outcome/.
135. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Florida II, 141 S. Ct. at 1175 (2021). Due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, Oral argument occurred by phone in 2020. Instead of the normal freefor-all, the Justices asked questions seriatim.
136. Florida II, 141 S. Ct. at 1180.
137. Id. at 1183.
138. Id. at 1181 n.*.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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this question leaves a large gap in equitable apportionment caselaw.
Clues from how the Court handled Florida I and Florida II and Idaho v.
Oregon, the body of traditional equitable apportionment law, and tort law
in general are indicative of what standard the Court may decide to apply
in the future to multiple causes of harm.
A. History and Lead Up to Florida v. Georgia
Unless by a force of God, the rivers in this basin suddenly do not cross
state lines, Florida and Georgia will be locked in battle for eternity. The
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) Basin cuts through Georgia,
Alabama, and Florida before terminating in the Gulf of Mexico.141 The
three river systems come together throughout the various states and
affect the industries, species, and livelihoods of those in their wake.142
Arising in the North Georgia Mountains, the ACF River Basin cuts
through Atlanta on its way to the Gulf.143 As of 2019, according to the
Metro Atlanta Chamber, metro-Atlanta’s population swelled to just over
six million residents.144 With each resident requiring water to live, the
load on Atlanta’s systems is a heavy burden indeed. Due to the unique
geological makeup of low porosity-granite and schist rock surrounding
and including Atlanta, groundwater options in Atlanta are extremely
scarce.145 Therefore, to provide for the demands of the steadily growing
major city,146 surface water from rivers, lakes, or streams must be used.
The southeastern portion of Georgia sits above the Floridan Aquifer
System, one of the most productive aquifer systems in the country.147 For
this coastal and coastal-plains portion of Georgia, withdrawing
groundwater from the Floridan Aquifer System satisfies the needs of
141. Map of the ACF Basin, in Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Focus
Area of Study, USGS.GOV (2018), https://www.usgs.gov/media/images/apalachicolachattahoochee-flint-river-basin-focus-area-study.
142. Id.
143. Id. The waters of the ACF Basin wind through Georgia making this an issue that
affect almost the entirety of the state.
144. Profile of Metro Atlanta, METRO ATLANTA CHAMBER, at 3 (June 30,
2020) .https://www.metroatlantachamber.com/assets/profile_of_metro_atlanta_june_30_20
20_4XNEopP.pdf.
145. Granite does not make a good aquifer. Groundwater in granitic and metamorphic
rocks? ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENVIRONMENT (Feb. 07, 2021) https://www.encyclopedieenvironnement.org/en/water/groundwater-in-granitic-and-metamorphic-rocks/.
146. Profile of Metro Atlanta, METRO ATLANTA CHAMBER, (June 30, 2020)
https://www.metroatlantachamber.com/assets/profile_of_metro_atlanta_june_30_2020_4X
NEopP.pdf.
147. Saving
Water
in
Georgia,
EPA,
(June
2013)
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2017-02/documents/ws-ourwater-georgia-state-factsheet.pdf.
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these smaller communities.148 However, in other parts of the state,
mainly around Atlanta, for drinking water purposes and the surrounding
communities for agriculture, water to meet these needs must come from
surface water such as from the ACF Basin.149
1. The Water Wars
In 1990, the Tri-State Water Wars, as they are colloquially known,
formally commenced when Alabama sued the United States Army Corps
of Engineers to prevent the Corps from reallocating the water from
interstate rivers that Alabama argued disproportionately favored
Georgia’s interests.150 Florida followed suit a year later with a lawsuit
containing similar allegations against the Corps.151
In 2014, Florida officially filed suit against Georgia in the Supreme
Court of the United States and asked the Court to equitably apportion
the waters of the ACF Basin and reduce the amount of water Georgia
could rightfully use.152
2. Florida v. Georgia
In response to disappearing oysters in the Apalachicola Bay Area and
the adverse effect the loss of this integral species has on the local
ecosystem and economy, Florida filed a suit of original jurisdiction
against Georgia in the Supreme Court.153 Florida alleged that Georgia’s
use of the waters of the Flint River, part of the ACF Basin that empties
into the Apalachicola Bay, adversely affected the oysters of the bay, and
harmed the citizens of Florida in return.154
In the original filing of this complaint, Georgia’s use of water from the
Chattahoochee to provide for the needs of the citizens of Atlanta was
implicated, but in subsequent filings, Florida adjusted its complaint to
cover only the waters of the Flint River, which is mainly used for
agricultural purposes in the southwestern part of Georgia.155 Florida
subsequently petitioned the Court and sought a decree that would
148. Ground Water Atlas of the United States: Segment 6- Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
DEPARTMENT
OF
THE
INTERIOR,
12,
and
South
Carolina,
U.S.
https://pubs.usgs.gov/ha/730g/report.pdf.
149. Tri-State Water Wars Overview, ATLANTA REGIONAL COUNCIL (Feb. 2, 2021),
https://atlantaregional.org/natural-resources/water/tri-state-water-wars-overview/.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Florida v. Georgia (Florida I), 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2509 (2018).
154. Id.
155. Complaint for Equitable Apportionment and Injunctive Relief at 2-3, Florida I, 138
S. Ct. at 2502 (No. 142 Original).
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mandate Georgia to reduce its overall consumption of water from the
rivers of the ACF Basin.156
In 2018, after the first Special Master made findings and Florida
appealed those findings, the Court remanded the original action for a
second time for a new Special Master to make findings and
recommendations on additional, specific issues.157 Upon gathering more
facts on the issue, the second Special Master made a recommendation
that the Court deny Florida’s petition for relief—the main reason being
that Florida “proved no serious injury caused by Georgia’s alleged
overconsumption.”158 Florida again filed exceptions to the
recommendation of this Special Master as well and the Court
independently reviewed the record accordingly.159
In Florida II, the Court held that consistent with over 100 years of
precedent, the grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court by the
U.S. Constitution allows the Court to have the authority to equitably
apportion water from rivers that run between states.160 The Court laid
out the test for what is required to obtain an equitable apportionment of
interstate streams between states and what Florida must show
accordingly.161
For this test, the Court returned to language from previous holdings
in Colorado I and Colorado II.162 First, the complaining state—usually
downstream and in this case Florida—must “prove a threatened or actual
injury ‘of serious magnitude’ caused by Georgia’s upstream water
consumption.”163 The second showing Florida must make is that the
“benefits of [apportionment] substantially outweigh the harm that might
result.”164 The Court then mentioned that because both Florida and
Georgia are states that employ the doctrine of riparian rights, an
essential principle for analysis is that both Florida and Georgia have “an
equal right to make a reasonable use” of the waters of the ACF Basin.165
Florida claimed that two separate injuries arose from Georgia’s
overconsumption of water from the ACF Basin.166 These two separate

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Florida II, 141 S. Ct. at 1178.
Florida I, 138 S. Ct. at 2508.
Florida II, 141 S. Ct. at 1178.
Id. at 1180 (citing Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S. 445, 453 (2015)).
Id. (citing Nebraska, 574 U.S. at 454).
Florida II, 141 S. Ct. at 1180.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Colorado I, 459 U.S. at 187 (alteration in original)).
Id. (quoting Florida I, 138 S. Ct. at 2502).
Id.
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injuries are (1) the failure of the Apalachicola Bay oyster industry and
(2) harm to the environment and ecosystem of the implicated river
systems.167 Florida did not argue that it was required to prove the
existence of the injury and its causation by clear and convincing
evidence.168
Neither state, Florida and Georgia, argued that the collapse of the
oyster industry in the Apalachicola Bay Area did not meet the standard
for an injury of a serious magnitude.169 The issue before the Supreme
Court in this case focused, instead, on the cause of this agreed upon
injury as opposed to the existence and extent of that injury.170
Through a “multistep causal chain,” Florida attributed the collapse of
the oyster industry in Florida to Georgia’s overuse of the waters of the
ACF Basin for supplying Southwestern Georgia’s agricultural needs.171
The cause Georgia points to is a much more direct cause for the collapse
of the oyster fishery than Florida’s chain, mismanagement of the
industry by Florida.172
Georgia further argued that even if the Court found that low flows,
and not Florida’s mismanagement of the oyster industry, were the main
cause of death and deterioration of the oyster industry, Georgia did not
contribute to the lack of flow.173 Georgia continued its argument by
noting that although Florida may have proven some harmful changes
occurred in the bay and to the oyster population, Florida failed to prove
that these alleged injuries were caused by Georgia rather than the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers’ involvement in the area or caused by climate
factors such as drought.174
Although the Court mentioned that many of these important facts of
river flow depend on scientific analysis, the Special Master was put in
place by the Court to make a recommendation on the issue.175 The Court
ultimately agreed with the Special Master that Florida did not meet the
clear and convincing burden.176

167. Id. at 1179.
168. Id. at 1180.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1180–81.
174. Georgia’s Reply to Florida’s Exceptions to the Report of the Special Master, No. 142
Original at 22.
175. Florida II, 141 S. Ct. at 1181.
176. Id.
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For the opinion of the Court, Justice Barrett chose to focus on the
number of factors that influence the flow of the Apalachicola River.177
The Court focused on the variable amounts of precipitation, air
temperature, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ involvement, drought, and
Georgia’s unreasonable use of the waters of the ACF River Basin for
agriculture as factors all present that influenced the flow of the
Apalachicola River.178
In the only footnote present in the case, Justice Barrett, writing for
the majority, said in response to Florida’s argument that Georgia’s
overconsumption was the sole cause of the collapse of Florida’s oyster
industry or at least a substantial factor in its downfall that: “[w]e have
not specified the causation standard applicable in equitableapportionment cases. We need not do so here, for Florida has failed to
establish a sufficient causal connection under any of the parties’ proposed
standards.”179 In addressing Florida’s evidence and how it fell short of
meeting the burden, the Court said:
The fundamental problem with evidence—a problem that pervades
Florida’s submission in this case—is that it establishes at most that
increased salinity and predation contributed to the collapse, not that
Georgia’s overconsumption caused the increased salinity and
predation. None of these witnesses or reports point to Georgia’s
overconsumption as a significant cause of the high salinity and
predation.180

Because Florida did not provide any evidence that could prove
Georgia’s overconsumption caused the increased salinity in the bay and
in turn the collapse of the oyster population, the Court could not step in
and exercise its “extraordinary authority to control the conduct of a
coequal sovereign.”181 The most the Court could do with this evidence is
remind Georgia that the state is under an obligation to reasonably use
the water, but ultimately, the Court dismissed the case.182 The causal
chain was too tenuous for the Court to step in and equitably apportion
the waters of the ACF River Basin under these facts.
VI. THE COURT’S HESITANCY TO ADDRESS THE IMPLICATIONS OF

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 1179.
Id.
Id. at 1181.
Id. at 1182.
Id. at 1183.
Id.
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MULTIPLE CAUSES
Though the issue of multiple causes was not ultimately pertinent to
the decision in Florida II, this issue still remains unanswered and in
desperate need of clarity from the Court.183 Though no case of Supreme
Court original jurisdiction regarding equitable apportionment of water to
date has turned on the requisite standard of causation, the line of cases
before Florida and Georgia is direct evidence that litigation in this area
is becoming more complex. Changes in climate are affecting
environmental disputes and this potential cause of injury must be
distinguished from other causes of injury in disputes between two
sovereign states.
Because of the unique nature of the line of cases arising from the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, there is not a clear indication of
what the Court is bound to hold regarding the threshold standard of
causation required in a case of equitable apportionment. However, there
is evidence that when the Court does finally approach this issue, it will
require that a high standard of causation be present for a contributing
cause to be worthy of invoking the Court’s “extraordinary” powers of
equitable apportionment.
The Court may have been hesitant to answer this question of what to
do when presented with multiple causes, but the question was
nonetheless at the forefront of the Court’s mind during not only the
opinion but oral argument as well.184 Chief Justice Roberts framed the
same question of what do about multiple causes as the one to Mr. Garre
of Florida to Mr. Primis of Georgia.185 Counsel for Georgia answered back
quickly brushing aside the question of the Chief Justice.186 “[T]he Court
has not directly addressed the causation issue that you posed in its prior
cases . . . [and] the Court need not actually decide it [today] . . .” stated
Mr. Primis.187 However, after a bit of back and forth between the Chief
Justice and Georgia’s counsel, a stance was taken by Georgia.188 For the
Court to order a potential remedy of such an “extraordinary nature,”
Georgia argued that the standard of causation must be akin to something
high like the substantial factor analysis that is sometimes used to
establish a but-for cause in tort law.189

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Florida II, 141 S. Ct. at 1181 n.*.
Florida v. Georgia, 2021 WL 678125 (U.S.) (Oral Argument) (2021).
Id. at 5, 38.
Id. at 38.
Id.
Id. at 38–39.
Id. at 39.
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A. Causation Standard Options
Florida argued, in Florida II, that Georgia’s over consumption of
waters of the ACF Basin was “the sole cause of the collapse or at least a
substantial factor contributing to it.”190 The Court held that Florida’s
evidence did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Georgia’s
alleged overconsumption of water “played more than a trivial role in the
collapse.”191 These three options for standard of causation—sole cause,
substantial factor, and trivial role— are all options that the Court has
not explicitly ruled out per the footnote.192 However, to clear up what
standard of causation the Court should use, evidence from not only this
opinion, but other equitable apportionment cases and general tort law
will be employed.
1. Trivial Role: Insubstantial Contributing Cause
The standard of causation that the Court would be least likely to use
in cases of equitable apportionment is the standard of “trivial role.” A
contributing cause is “a factor that—though not the primary cause—
plays a part in producing a result.”193 Counsel for both Florida and
Georgia argued for a standard higher than an insubstantial contributing
cause during oral argument.194 A causation standard higher than
insubstantial contributing cause would add more certainty to not only
findings by the Court but to the belief that the imposed “extraordinary”
remedy of equitable apportionment would be effective at remedying the
alleged harm.195
2. Sole Cause
A standard of “sole cause” causation would be an unnecessarily
underinclusive standard. A standard this high would undoubtedly
exclude causes of harm that could contribute to the damage caused by
overconsumption of water, such as drought. However, if the goal of the
190. Florida II, 141 S. Ct. at 1181 (emphasis in original).
191. Id. at 1182.
192. Florida II, 141 S. Ct. at 1181 n.* (holding that Florida did not meet the burden of
proof for this element so the court did not have to look to the amount of causation necessary
here).
193. Contributing Cause, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 2021).
194. Though Florida in oral argument argued for Georgia’s actions to be treated as a
substantial factor, Florida v. Georgia, 2021 WL 678125 (U.S.) (Oral Argument) at 5–6
(2021), the Court concluded that Florida had not even proven by clear and convincing
evidence that Georgia’s water consumption played a trivial role to the collapse. Florida II,
141 S. Ct. at 1182.
195. Florida II, 141 S. Ct. at 1183; Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 217–18 (2014)
(explaining the confusion a contributing cause standard would create in implementation).
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Court is to keep all but the most egregious instances of overconsumption
of water out of the Court system, this standard would be applicable and
would suffice to reserve the remedy of equitable apportionment for only
the rarest of instances.
By nature of meeting the high standard of sole cause causation, a
downstream state would have unequivocally proven causation for their
case. Cases like New Jersey v. New York are easy to spot the sound nature
of a sole cause equitable apportionment. Because the only harm come
from the future diversion of river water by New York an equitable
apportionment much more likely.196 Because an equitable apportionment
by the Court would effectively restrain the sole cause of the alleged harm,
the Court was able to issue an effective solution that would provide the
downstream state with a complete remedy to their solution.197
i. Who Gets the Drought?
If the standard of causation is sole cause, in years of drought—when
most equitable apportionment cases are raised—the downstream state
will never be able to show by clear and convincing evidence that the harm
they suffer is solely because of the upstream state’s use of water. The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama held
in a decision in 2006 that “[t]he court cannot hold the [Army] Corps [of
Engineers] responsible for the absence of rain.”198 Following that logic,
under a sole cause standard of causation, the downstream state would
have the burden of proving that (1) not only did the upstream state cause
the harm, but (2) the drought did not cause any harm. This unnecessarily
high standard would keep all but the most egregious circumstances out
of court.
The Court is called to equitably apportion water between two
sovereign states and is shown to treat this remedy with reverence.199
However, this remedy exists at the Court’s disposal to step in and correct
harms fairly and equitably for all states. A standard of causation akin to
a but-for cause would necessarily account for other factors such as
drought and would still allow for this “extraordinary” remedy to be
workable and effective.

196. See generally New Jersey, 283 U.S. at 336.
197. See Id. at 341, 345–46.
198. Alabama v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 441 F.Supp.2d 1123, 1134 (N.D.
Ala. 2006). If a justiciable party cannot be held responsible for a drought, where does the
relief for the lack of water come from? During years of drought, the upstream state would
be incentivized to use as much water as it wanted without regard for the downstream state
because of the lack of repercussions or Supreme Court oversight.
199. Florida II, 141 S. Ct. at 1183 (extraordinary authority).

2021

WHO GETS THE DROUGHT

447

3. Substantial Factor/But-For Causation
A high standard of causation is necessary for claims of equitable
apportionment because of the unique nature of the remedy sought by
these cases. Because one state is asking the Supreme Court to step in
and regulate the seemingly sovereign act of using water within the
borders of another state, this “extraordinary measure” calls for reverence
and almost absolute certainty.200 Much like the use of the clear and
convincing standard of proof for the evidence of causation and injury, the
Court should employ an equal or higher standard of causation to this case
as well.
The classic tort law standard of “but-for causation” would be the most
effective standard of causation that the Court could employ is cases of
equitable apportionment. The Restatement (Third) of Torts classifies
“Factual Cause” by stating that “[t]ortious conduct must be a factual
cause of harm for liability to be imposed. Conduct is a factual cause of
harm when the harm would not have occurred absent the conduct.”201
This test is commonly referred to as the “but-for” test for causation.202
The existence of multiple “but-for” causes of harm does not prevent each
cause from itself being a “but-for” cause.203 Because of the ability to
account for multiple causes of harm, the flexibility incorporated in this
standard is an important attribute for the Court to employ.
Factual scenarios where only a sole cause of harm exists are rare in
the realm of equitable apportionment204 and if the Court is to offer a
remedy for over consumption of water by an upstream state, the analysis
should match the nature of the harms and causation. Therefore, the
Court should employ a causation standard that is neither underinclusive,
nor overinclusive but is instead flexible.
i. Idaho v. Oregon
Evidence for a higher standard of causation being not only the most
optimal standard but the standard the Court will eventually adopt is
found in the case of Idaho v. Oregon.205 Here, the Court extended the
already widely accepted doctrine of equitable apportionment of interstate
river water to be the framework for the division of interstate fish

200. Id. (clear and convincing standard).
201. Restatement (Third) of Torts, § 26.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See New Jersey, 283 U.S. at 341. New York’s diversion of river water would be the
only change in circumstances affecting the people of New Jersey.
205. Idaho, 462 U.S. at 1017.
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populations.206 Idaho argued for Court intervention to equitably
apportion the anadromous fish that move from Washington and Oregon
on the Columbia-Snake River system and eventually downstream to
Idaho.207
Idaho argued that not only do the eight constructed dams along the
river system impact and deprive Idaho of their rights to the fish but
overharvesting by Oregon and Washington along the river system is
another factor in depleting the fish population.208 The Special Master
assigned to this case noted that the alleged cause of harm of the eight
dams affected all parties and because of the necessity of the dams, it was
“highly unlikely that the dams will be removed or . . . reduced.”209 He
then turned to the alleged cause of overfishing by Oregon and
Washington.210
Through looking at data collected for over a decade on fish harvesting
on the Columbia-Snake River System, the Special Master concluded, and
the Court confirmed, that Oregon and Washington are not now injuring
Idaho’s portion of fish by overfishing the river system.211 The evidence
also did not show by a substantial likelihood that Oregon or Washington
will injure Idaho in the future.212 Because the evidence did not prove by
clear and convincing evidence that there was a present or future interest
in need of redressability, Idaho did not meet its burden with respect to
the parties before it in court, Oregon and Washington.213
Though the Court did not hesitate to apply the doctrine of equitable
apportionment to cases involving interstate-flowing wildlife, it was
cautious to step in and apply such an egregious use of power over the
sovereignty of states if not only was the harm there, but the causation of
the harm was too tenuous. For the harm to be effectively alleviated by
this broad use of Supreme Court power, the Court must direct its remedy
at the correct source of the injury. In Idaho, the eight dams along the
river may have been the source of the lack of fish downstream, but an
equitable apportionment of fish between Idaho, Oregon, and Washington

206. Id. at 1018. The court has since applied equitable apportionment principles to not
only interstate water and fish disputes, but most recently to disputes regarding interstate
aquifers. Mississippi v. Tennessee, No. 143 Org, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 5870* (Nov. 22, 2021).
207. Id. at 1023.
208. Id. at 1021.
209. Id. at 1027. This is to say that though dams along the river may be the main cause
of lack of fish, their value outweighs the harm of altering the dams.
210. Id. at 1027–28.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1028.
213. Id. at 1028–29.
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binding the fish harvesting practices of the upstream states would not
attach a solution to the cause that could alleviate the most harm to
Idaho.214
ii. Evidence from Florida II
Though the Court explicitly held that it was not going to decide the
issue of standard of causation under the facts of Florida II, the opinion
and corresponding oral arguments from both parties provides evidence
for how the Court may eventually hold on this issue in the future.215
Reverence for the act of imposing an equitable apportionment as well as
language pointing to the need at minimum for Georgia’s use to be a
significant cause come together to shed some more light on the potential
standard of causation that the Court may employ in the future.
Throughout the opinion of Florida II, the Court mentions the authority
of the Supreme Court to equitably apportion the waters between the two
sovereign states.216 This authority is described as “extraordinary” by the
Court in that the act the Court would be performing would necessarily
“control the conduct of a coequal sovereign.”217 Describing the act of
equitable apportionment as “extraordinary” shows that the Court does
not view this remedy lightly. Extraordinary authority most naturally
comports with an extraordinary standard upon which the Court should
attribute causation.
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, though the Supreme Court has not specifically laid out
a requisite standard for causation required for equitable apportionment
of an interstate flowing river, evidence stemming from how the Court
confronts other elements in cases of equitable apportionment and general
tort law concepts come together to lay out the standard of causation that
the Court should use. The pervasiveness of drought would not serve as a
gatekeeper for these suits and the remedy that is an equitable
apportionment would still be attainable. Causes that are substantial
factors that would meet a but-for analysis would effectively accomplish
the goals of the Court in equitably apportioning consumption of river
water.

214.
215.
216.
217.

See generally Id.
Florida II, 141 S. Ct. at 1181 n.*.
Id. at 1180, 1183.
Id. at 1183.

